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IDENTIFYING PLAUSIBLE CASCADING EVENTS IN 
SYSTEM STABILITY ASSESSMENT 
Bogdan OTOMEGA1*, Thierry VAN CUTSEM2  
 
An implementation of the event tree approach is proposed to determine 
possible sequences of cascading failures with severe impact on a given power 
system. The algorithm takes into account protection systems hidden failures and 
transmission system equipments overload. At each level of the event tree 
development, the sequence probability order is computed and a filtering tool is used 
to identify possible harmful sequence. These are furthermore analysed with a time 
domain simulation tool in order to assess their impact on the power system. This 
paper contains the description of the event tree algorithm as well as examples of its 
practical application on the Nordic32 test system. 
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1. Introduction 
Power system are designed and planned to withstand predetermined 
disturbances. However, the impact of an initial disturbance may be aggravated by 
other sources of vulnerability such as human errors, system topology changes, 
protection/control system failures, power flow changes due to electricity market, 
missing or erroneous system information when taking important decisions, or 
communication network failures when sending critical control signals. Thus, 
under these conditions the power system may become vulnerable, and cascading 
events could develop which may lead to separation of the power system into 
islands and results in the loss of a substantial amount of load.  
Due to their low occurrence probability, cascading failure events are not 
taken into account when designing the control and protection systems. Thus, these 
systems are unable to maintain or restore system stability in this unanticipated and 
complex situations. 
However, cascading failures in large-scale electric power systems are an 
important cause of the latest blackouts experienced all over the world [1-3]. In 
recent years this type of incidents seem to increase in frequency and severity, 
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possibly due to the complex environment brought about by the electric industry 
deregulation. In the same time, the economic penalties associated with such 
events are increasing as the society is heavily dependent on the availability of 
high-quality power supply. The fact that the consequences of these cascading 
events could be very severe and that the simple equipments failure combination 
produces a combinatorial explosion, were the motivations to build an algorithm 
meant to identify plausible severe cascading events that could be used for security 
assessment. 
2. Protection systems and hidden failures 
Protection systems are designed to initiate switching actions to rapidly and 
reliably isolate faults. Standard designs ensure the reliability of a fault isolation at 
the expense of some small likelihood of false trips. This approach minimizes 
component system damage and is appropriate when the system is in a normal 
operating state. 
The main drawback is that, in general, these relays take actions to protect a 
localized region of the network without considering the impact on the whole 
network [4]. For example, under power system stress conditions, due to outages or 
excessive loading, additional switching to isolate faults will cause additional 
stress that may contribute to widespread system failures. Moreover, if the 
switching is due to an incorrect relay operation, the protection system contribute 
to power system weakening. 
The failures of generating units, transmission lines, transformers and other 
power system components can be grouped into the following categories [5]: 
· Independent outages, when the outage of each equipment is caused by 
an independent fault. Independent outages of two or more elements are referred to 
as overlapping or simultaneous independent outages. The probability of such an 
outage is calculated as the product of individual equipments failure probability. 
· Dependent outages, when the outage is the result of the occurrence of 
one or more other outages. Dependent outages are the protection systems response 
to the changing system parameters due to what previously happened in the power 
system. An example is the incorrect operations of 3rd zone relay observing high 
currents and low voltages under stress conditions. The probability of such an 
outage can be approximated, due to their low probability, with the product of the 
failure probabilities of each equipment as if there were independent. 
· Common-cause outages are outages having an external cause with 
multiple failure effects, where the effects are not consequences of each other. An 
example is the primary protection failure followed by the back-up protection 
clearing, which disconnects more equipments. The effect of common-cause 
outages on reliability indices can be significant and comparable with the effect of 
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N-2 or higher-order outages. The probability of a common-cause outage is larger 
than the probability of independent outages resulting in a similar event.  
· Station originated outages can occur due to a ground fault on the 
breaker, a stuck breaker, bus faults or a combination of these outages. This can 
produce the outage of two or more transmission elements and/or generating units, 
which are not necessarily on the same right-of-way. The bus-bar fault is one of the 
well-known station originated outages, all transmission or generation components 
connected to that specific bus-bar being tripped. 
Among the incorrect relay operations, a common scenario exists: the relay 
has an undetected defect that remains dormant until abnormal operating 
conditions are reached. This is often referred as hidden failure [6]. 
In [7] the protection system hidden failure is defined as a permanent defect 
that will cause an individual relay or a relay system to incorrectly and 
inappropriately remove system components as a direct consequence of another 
switching event. In order a relay failure to be considered as hidden failure, one 
must be able to monitor the defect which led to relay misoperation with an 
appropriate supervision system. A failure that results in an immediate trip without 
any prior event is not considered a hidden failure, because the power system is 
designed to withstand the loss of any component (N-1 criterion). 
In general hidden failures are of two kinds [8]: 
· software failures: the protection system settings are inappropriate or 
outdated for the prevailing system conditions. Consequently, although the relay 
functions correctly, in effect it has a hidden failure because of the inappropriate 
setting. This category may include human errors or negligence [9];  
· hardware failures: actual failure in the relay.  
In sequel are presented the normal functioning and the possible failure 
modes of the directional comparison blocking scheme, which is one of the most 
popular protection schemes for protecting HV and EHV transmission lines. The 
one-line diagram and the schematic control logic are presented in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1. One line diagram and schematic logic of the directional comparison blocking scheme 
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The usual sequence of actions for a fault in the protected area, e.g. F1, is 
the following: the directional relays DA and DB are picking up the fault and close 
their normally open contacts. The fault detectors FDA and FDB do not see the 
fault, thus their respective transmitter TA and TB do not send the action blocking 
signal, the receiver relays RA and RB remain closed. Consequently, the line is 
instantaneously cleared from both ends by opening the respective circuit breakers 
CBA and CBB.  
For a fault situated outside the protected line, e.g. F2, the fault detector 
FDA picks up the fault and gives the permission to transmitter TA to start sending 
the action blocking signal. The receiver relay RB opens his normally closed 
contacts and avoids the opening of the circuit breaker CBB. 
Table 1. presents the possible hidden failures of the directional comparison 
blocking scheme leading to incorrect trip. 
Table 1 
Failure modes of the directional comparison blocking scheme 
Hidden failure Effect Consequence 
The FD cannot be activated No action blocking signal Line trip from one end 
T blocked  No action blocking signal  Line trip from one end 
D continuously activated Override action blocking signal Line trip from one end 
R cannot receive signal Receiver relay remains closed Line trip from one end 
R continuously activated Receiver relay always open Line does not trip from both ends 
CB contacts stuck CB could not open Line does not trip from both ends 
3. Using event trees to model cascading outages 
Event trees are structures which starting from an “undesired initiator” can 
describe a chronological sequence of events. Each new event depends on what 
previously happened and for each new possible event considered, a new branch 
and a node are added in the tree, with the associated probability. 
The functioning of the protection systems as well as the development of a 
cascading outage can be described by a sequence of dependent events. If in the 
first case the sequence is governed by the time delays used to initiate/inhibit 
protection actions, in the second case the disconnection of power system 
equipments sequence is uncontrolled and depends on previous events and their 
impact on the power system and the time delays of different protection systems. In 
both cases the event tree is a suitable structure to model the sequence of events. 
Such an event tree structures were used in order to model the protection 
failure scenarios, including stuck breaker events [10] or hidden failures [11]. Also, 
the algorithm presented in [12] can be seen as an event tree for power system 
equipment overloads.  
The first two steps in Fig. 2. diagram represent the reduced form of a 
protection system event tree, where the upper branch represents the sequence of 
events leading to the normal clearing (NC) of the fault and the lower branch 
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includes all possible sequences corresponding to hidden failures (see Table 1.) 
resulting in protection system clearing failure (CF).  
 
Fig. 2. Cascading outage event tree 
 
As illustrated in Fig. 2., starting from the action of the primary protection, 
the model of a cascading outage event tree can be developed. The events taken 
into account when expanding the event tree could be classified into: 
· overloaded equipments trip (OE). This category includes the tripping 
action of transmission lines due to high current and of reactive power limited 
generators due to low voltage. The associated probability to this event is p1=1; 
· protection system hidden failures (HF), which includes both software 
and hardware failures. For example we consider inadvertent trip of transmission 
lines approaching limits or limited generators, due to inappropriate settings, and, 
respectively, relay malfunction (e.g. 2nd and 3rd zone relay). Depending of the 
hidden failure type, the associated probability, p2, can be determined using linear 
or exponential functions or approximated with the standard component 
unavailability;  
· back-up protection action (BP), which may disconnect more than one 
equipment. For example, in the stuck breaker case the back-up protection may 
disconnect all equipments connected to the same bus-bar as the faulted one. The 
probability of this event, p3 (which can be approximated as the product between 
the probability of the initial fault and the hidden failure probability), is greater 
than the probability of independent outages resulting in a similar event. 
Taking into account the probabilities associated to each branch of the 
event tree, results that, we can compute the probability of each sequence. To this 
purpose the rare event probability approximation is usually made [13]. The main 
idea of this approximation is that probabilities of the independent events  
considered in the sequence have very small values and almost same magnitude 
order. Therefore, the high order terms in the probability polynomial expression 
can be omitted. It results that, a probability order can be associated to each 
sequence. The smaller the probability order the greater the occurrence probability.  
Referring to Fig. 2., the probability of the 3rd sequence from the top can be 
written as pfp2p1, where pf is the probability of the initial fault. Appling the rare 
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event probability approximation, pf=p2=P, the sequence probability can be 
computed as P2, since p1=1. Thus, the probability order of the sequence is 2. 
4. Cascading outage determination algorithm 
Considering the cascading outage event tree model, Fig. 2, an algorithm to 
identify plausible cascading events can be developed including the following 
steps: 
1. Apply the initial disturbance to the initial state of the power system 
and draw up the list of next possible disturbances, including both software and 
hardware hidden failures related to the initial disturbance. During the event tree 
expansion this list will be updated in order to include overloaded system 
components and the possible software hidden failures of components approaching 
their limits.  
2. Apply a disturbance from the list determined at previous step. Priority 
is given to equipments exceeding limits (overloaded lines, reactive limited 
generators), if any, as their probability is equal to 1. More than one disturbance 
will be applied at once only if they have a common cause, see the back-up 
protection action. Even if methods as the ones presented in [6,7] consider the 
possibility of more than one hidden failure per sequence, due to their very low 
probability, we consider only one per sequence, as in [14]. Furthermore, we 
consider hardware hidden failures revealed only by the initial fault. If a specific 
sequence includes already a hidden failure and the list of possible disturbances 
does not contain an overloaded equipment the sequence expansion is stopped. 
3. Classify the sequences into harmless or potentially harmful. To this 
purpose we use a procedure based on voltage drop estimates computed with linear 
approximation methods, detailed in [15]. The sequences are flagged as potentially 
harmful if the post-contingency voltage drops are larger than a specified threshold 
value.  
4. Compute the probability order of the sequences using the rare event 
probability approximation. For the sequences flagged as harmless, if the 
probability order is smaller than a predefined threshold, then the algorithm 
proceeds with Step 2, else the sequence development is stopped. 
5. Analyze the potentially harmful sequences with Quasi Steady-State 
(QSS) time simulation [18] in order to assess the sequence severity. If the system 
behavior is unstable the development of that specific sequence is stopped. If the 
system is stable and if the sequence probability order is smaller than the threshold, 
then go to Step 2, otherwise stop the sequence development. During the time 
simulation, overloaded lines and reactive limited generators are added to the list 
of possible disturbances (with probability 1 of occurrence), as well as the 
transmission lines or the generators approaching or reaching limits (with 
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probability p1). Afterwards, when a sequence involving such tripping is analyzed 
with QSS simulation, the equipment is tripped only after it gets overloaded or 
limited, with or without a temporization.  
The resulting cascading events can be divided with respect to the power 
system behavior into stable and unstable sequences. In the former case we can 
compute the security margin, while in the latter case we can determine which are 
the corrective actions, e.g. amount of load shedding. These parameters can be 
used in order to rank the resulting cascading outages and also to identify weak 
areas.  
5. Algorithm results 
The proposed algorithm has been tested on the Nordic32 test system used 
by a CIGRE Task Force on Long-term Dynamics. The data can be found in [19] 
while the one-line diagram is shown in Fig. 3.  
 
Fig. 3. Nordic32 test system  
 
The model includes 55 buses, 23 generators and 22 voltage-sensitive 
loads. We have assumed for all buses a double bus-bar configuration, with the 
power flows balanced as much as possible on the two bus-bars. In the nodes were 
both load and generation are connected, we considered them connected to the 
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same bus-bar. Hence, when considering a stuck breaker situation less equipments 
are tripped by the back-up protection and the power imbalance is less severe. 
Table 2. presents a summary of the results obtained starting from a list of 
155 initial disturbances, including all branches and generators. The criterion to 
accept a system time evolution was that all transmission voltages remain above 
0.85 pu.  
Table 2 
Summary of the algorithm results 
 Total number Prob. order 1 Prob. order 2 Prob. order 3 
All scenarios 714  5 457 252 
Unstable 571 5 314 252 
Stable 143 - 143 - 
 
As can be seen, a number of 714 sequences were retained, out of which 
571 represent unstable scenarios, with different probability orders. The remaining 
are scenarios with stable voltage evolution but resulting in lost load. Note that, 
some scenarios include the same disturbances but the sequence is different. Thus, 
the above figures should be corrected in order to count them only once. 
Furthermore, at the considered operating point the system is very stressed 
and cannot withstand the loss of generators g6, g14, g15, g15b and g16, which are 
correctly identified by the algorithm as probability order 1 sequences. A great part 
of the unstable scenarios include these generators, mostly g6 and g14 located 
close to the load area. 
Figure 6. presents the voltage evolution at the most affected buses in a 
probability order 3 case. The initial disturbance, is the loss of line 4021-4042, 
followed by the false trip of 4043-4042. This causes the field current of generator 
g7 to get limited and after a temporization of 60 s (the value was chosen for figure 
legibility reasons) is tripped. After the loss of g7, two more generators get limited, 
namely g14 and g6. 
 
Fig. 6. Voltage evolution and cascade sequence 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper outlines the implementation of an event tree based algorithm to 
identify plausible cascading events. The even tree development considers various 
events such as hidden failures and overloaded equipments trippings. The resulting 
cascading scenarios can be used in system stability assessment studies as well as 
to devise system protection schemes. 
The proposed scheme has been successfully tested on the small Nordic32 
test system. As of writing this paper, promising results have been obtained on the 
model of a real-life system. 
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